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Comments on Public Integrity Auditing for
Dynamic Data Sharing with Multi-user
Modification
Yong Yu, Yannan Li, Jianbing Ni, Guomin Yang, Yi Mu and
Willy Susilo
Abstract— Recently, a practical public integrity auditing
scheme supporting multi-user data modification (IEEE
Trans. on Information Forensics and Security, DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2015.2423264) was proposed. Although the
protocol was claimed secure, in this paper, we show that the
proposal fails to achieve soundness, the most essential property
that an auditing scheme should provide. Specifically, we show
that a cloud server can collude with a revoked user to deceive
a third-party auditor (TPA) that a stored file keeps virgin even
when the entire file has been deleted.
Keywords: Cloud storage, data integrity, soundness
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage enables cloud users to focus more on their
core competencies by alleviating data owners’ burden of
local data storage and maintenance. However, data integrity
becomes the biggest concern of cloud users because they lose
physical control over their outsourced files. Ateniese et al.
proposed the notion of provable data possession [1], or data
auditing, to address this challenging problem. Considering
many practical scenarios where all users sharing cloud data
need to read and modify the data, very recently, Yuan and Yu
[2] proposed a novel and efficient integrity auditing scheme
supporting multi-user modification, public auditing, high error
detection probability and efficient user revocation.
Contributions. We show the schemes in [2] fail to achieve
the basic property of a secure auditing scheme – soundness.
We demonstrate that in the scheme with basic user revocation,
if a malicious cloud server colludes with a revoked user, the
server is able to generate a valid proof of a challenge even
if the entire file has been deleted. The same attack can also
be applied to the multi-file auditing protocol and the protocol
with advanced user revocation in [2].
II. REVIEW
Some notations of the system are as follows. H() denotes a
one-way hash function and λ represents a security parameter.
G,G1 denote two multiplicative cyclic groups and e : G ×
G → G1 is a bilinear map. q is the order of G and g, u are
random generators of G. f~α(x) denotes a polynomial with
coefficients ~α = {α0, · · · , αs−1}, where αj ∈ Z∗q .
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Suppose there are K users {uk}0≤k≤K−1 in a group. The
data owner, u0, is the master user who can revoke any other
group users when necessary. We briefly review the following
algorithms in [2] to support our analysis.
Key Generation. u0 chooses K random numbers
{εk ∈ Zq∗}0≤k≤K−1 and a random α ∈ Zq∗, computes
ν = gαε0 , κ0 = gε0 , {κk = gεk , g
ε0
εk }1≤k≤K−1,
{gαj}0≤j≤s+1. The public key of u0 is PK =
(g, u, q, ν, {gαj}0≤j≤s+1, κ0, {κk, g
ε0
εk }1≤k≤K−1) and
the master key of u0 is MK = (ε0, α). The secret key of
user uk is εk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
File Processing. u0 first splits the file F into n blocks, and
each block into s sectors: {mij}1≤i≤n,0≤j≤s−1, and computes
authentication tag {σi}1≤i≤n for each block as:
σi = (u
Bi ·
∏s−1
j=0 g
mijαj+2)ε0 = (uBi · gf−→βi (α))ε0 .
where
−→
βi = {0, 0, βi,0, βi,1, · · · , βi,s−1} and βij = mij , Bi =
H(fname||i||ti||k), in which fname is the filename, i is the
index of data block mi, ti is the time stamp and k is the index
of the user in the group. Finally, u0 uploads data blocks and
tags to the cloud.
Challenge. The TPA randomly chooses d data blocks as a
set D. Suppose the chosen d blocks are modified by a set of
users, denoted by C. The TPA generates two random numbers
R and µ, and produces a set X = {(g
ε0
εk )R}k∈C . If D contains
blocks lastly modified by any revoked user, the TPA adds
(g
ε0
ε0+ρ )R to the set X . Then, the TPA sends the challenge
CM = (D,X, gR, µ) to the cloud.
Prove. Upon receiving the challenge CM = (D,X, gR, µ),
the cloud server generates a proof Prf = (π, ψ, y) and
forwards it to the TPA for verification. We omit the details
of generating a proof due to space limit.
Verify. Upon receiving the proof, the TPA verifies the
integrity of F by first computing η = uω , where w =∑
i∈D Bipi. Then it checks if the following equation holds:
e(η, κ0
R) · e(ψR, ν · κ0−µ)
?
= π · e(κ0−y, gR).
If it holds, it outputs Accept; otherwise outputs Reject.
User Revocation. The following steps are executed to
revoke a user, say uk (k 6= 0):
1) u0 randomly chooses ρ∈Zq∗, computes χ = ε0+ρεk
mod q and sends it to the cloud. u0 also computes
g
ε0
ε0+ρ and forwards it to the valid group users and the
TPA as a part of the PK.
2) Upon receiving χ, the cloud updates the authentication
tags of blocks that are lastly modified by uk as: σ′i =
σi
χ = (uBi · gf−→βi (α))ε0+ρ.
3) The TPA and the valid group users discard the public
information g
ε0
εk .
III. REMARKS ON THE PROTOCOL
Firstly, we revisit the system model of public integrity
auditing for dynamic data sharing with multi-user modification
[2]. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the system is composed of three
major entities, namely the cloud server, the TPA and group
users. Some users are valid users who can access and modify
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the cloud data while some other users have been revoked
due to a variety of reasons. For example, the secret key of
the user has been exposed or the user becomes dishonest.
Consequently, it is fair to assume that valid users in the group
are honest but the revoked users have incentive to become
an adversary of the system, i.e., they might collude with a
malicious cloud server to deceive a verifier.
Shared Data Flow
Cloud Server
TPA
Cloud Users
Valid usersRevoked 
users
Fig. 1. System model of public auditing with multi-user modification
A. Soundness of the protocol with basic user revocation
In the following, we describe a feasable attack on the
protocols in [2] where a malicious cloud server can collude
with a revoked user to generate a valid response even if the
entire file stored on cloud has been deleted.
During the execution of the protocol, the Key Generation,
File Processing and Update algorithm are the same as those
in [2]. Given a challenge CM = {D,X,E = gR, µ}, assume
the set D contains blocks lastly modified by a revoked user,
say uk(1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1) with secret key εk. According to the
protocol, (g
ε0
ε0+ρ )R is added to set X and χ = ε0+ρεk (mod q)
is sent to the cloud server. With such information and the
system public parameters, the cloud server and the revoked
user can collude to generate a response for challenge CM
without using the challenged data file as follows.
• Generate {pi = µi (mod q)}, i ∈ D and Bi =
H({fname ‖ i ‖ ti ‖ k}).
• Compute w =
∑
i∈D Bipi and η = u
ω .
• Retrieving (g
ε0
ε0+ρ )R from X , with the value εk from the
revoked user and χ from the cloud server, they compute
A = ((g
ε0
ε0+ρ )R)χεk = gε0R = κR0 .
• Pick a random t∗ ∈ Zq , compute ψ∗ = gt
∗
and B = Et
∗
.
• Pick a random y∗ ∈ Zq .
• Compute
π∗ =
e(η,A)·e(B,ν·κ−µ0 )
e(κ−y
∗
0 ,E)
.
The forgery Prf∗ = {π∗, ψ∗, y∗} is a valid proof for the
challenge CM because it can pass the Verify algorithm.
e(η, κR0 ) · e((ψ∗)R, ν · κ
−µ
0 ) = e(η,A) · e((gt
∗
)R, ν · κ−µ0 )
= e(η,A) · e(Et∗ , ν · κ−µ0 )
= e(η,A) · e(B, ν · κ−µ0 )
= π∗ · e(κ−y
∗
0 , E)
= π∗ · e(κ−y
∗
0 , g
R)
Therefore, the forged proof Prf∗ is valid. The cloud server
can deceive TPA that the file keeps intact even the entire
file has been polluted or deleted. Note that the same attack
can be applied to the protocol for efficient multi-file auditing,
where the TPA can handle integrity auditing of multiple
files simultaneously at the cost comparable to the single file
scenario, and we don’t repeat the attack here.
B. Soundness of the protocol with advanced user revocation
An advanced user revocation protocol was also proposed
in [2] to prevent the revoked users from generating valid
authentication tags by compromising a single cloud server
node. In this enhanced scheme, the master user u0 runs a
(U,N)-Shamir secret sharing protocol to generate N points
(i, f(i)) of a U − 1 degree polynomial f(x) = χ + a1x +
a2x
2 + · · · + aU−1xU−1. Those N points will be sent to N
nodes of a cloud server. Unfortunately, this technique cannot
make the protocol sound because it is the cloud server who
acts as the adversary when considering soundness and any U
out of N cloud nodes are able to recover χ using Lagrange
interpolation over a finite field. Specifically, given any U pairs
(i, f(i)), χ can be recovered as
χ =
∑
1≤i≤U
f(i)
∏
1≤i≤U,j 6=i
−j
i−j .
With the recovered χ, the malicious cloud server can collude
with a revoked user to break the soundness of the improved
protocol in [2].
Real-world dangers. If the protocols in [2] are adopted in
reality, after corrupting a revoked user, the malicious cloud
service providers can deceive the data owners by making use
of the aforementioned attacks. Consequently, the cloud servers
can charge the data owners for storage without hesitation but
do not store their data. As a result, the date owners cannot
retrieve the outsourced data when needed, which might incur
a significant loss to data owners since the lost data might be
important and unique.
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